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Abstract
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This paper investigates this intense M&A with the ambition to better understand the un-
derlying firms’ strategies. For that, we identify 6 different user groups that gravitate around
these multi-sided companies and we identify their most important market segments for each
company. Then, we track their mergers and acquisitions and we match them with the seg-
ments. This exercise shows that these five firms use M&A activity mostly to strengthen
their core market segments and only in rare cases to expand their activities into new ones.
Furthermore, most of the acquired products are shutdown post acquisition, suggesting that
firms acquire mainly the firm’s asset (functionality, technology, talent or IP) to integrate
them in their ecosystem rather than the products and users themselves. Acquisition is there-
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1 Introduction
The five largest tech giants, Apple, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Facebook and Microsoft,
known as the GAFAM, are among the largest market capitalization worldwide. These firms
operate as multisided platforms and they have created a large ecosystem of products, applica-
tions, services, content and users. They are creating value by offering to the different groups of
users gravitating around the platform services and by enabling interaction between and among
those groups.
The GAFAM have known a tremendous growth during the last two decades. This growth
is both internal and external. Their investment in research and development is huge with a
cumulated investment of more than $ 71 billion for the year 2017. In addition to these important
investments, the GAFAM firms have an extremely intense mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
activity.1 In 2017 for instance, the GAFAM have altogether made 55 different acquisitions.
Most of these acquisitions are young and innovative start-ups, but there are exceptions.
There are several reasons for a platform like the GAFAM firms to acquire an innovative
startup. First, the platform might be interested by the products developed by the startup. The
GAFAM have developed a large ecosystem of products and services and they are more and more
competing for attention i.e. to retain consumers on their platform (Prat and Valletti, 2019).
In this context, adding new products or functionalities is part of the competitive process and
acquisition is a way to develop the firm’s ecosystem. Second, the platform might be interested
by the input of the startup. They indeed have valuable assets (innovation, patent, engineer,
talent, customer base) that could be of interest to the platform. Last, acquisition may be a way
to limit potential competition and consolidate the platform’s position on the market.
These motivations echo the classical distinction in the industrial organisation literature
between conglomerate, vertical and horizontal mergers. An horizontal merger refers to an
acquisition in the same market, a vertical merger to an acquisition in the same supply chain and
a conglomerate merger to an acquisition in a new market. Horizontal and vertical mergers raise
competitive concerns as they reduce market competition or create a risk of vertical foreclosure
respectively, conglomerate mergers usually raise much less competitive concerns.
Competition authorities have the power to block an anticompetitive merger. However,
despite their intense merger activities, few of the GAFAM’s acquisitions have been scrutinized
by antitrust authorities, creating a growing fear that anti-competitive mergers were flying under
the antitrust radar. There are two main reasons for that.
First, the target firm is often too small and its revenue usually falls below the usual thresh-
old for investigation.2 There are of course exceptions to that. For instance, the mergers
between Apple/Shazam (2018) Microsoft/LinkedIn (2016), Facebook/WhatsApp (2014) and
Google/Doubleclick (2008) have all been approved by the European Commission and the merg-
ers between Facebook/Instagram (2012) and Google/Waze (2013) by the OFT. Despite that,
most of the acquisitions by the GAFAM are not scrutinized by competition authorities.3
Second, the acquired start-ups develop products and services that do not overlap with the
narrowly defined market in which the acquiring firm has a dominant position. For this reason,
1This paper focuses on the five largest tech companies by market capitalization, Google, Amazon, Facebook,
Apple and Microsoft. There are two reasons for focusing only those five firms. First, they are the most active
firms in terms of acquisition among the tech firms. For the years 2015-2017, they have acquired a total of 175
firms. Whereby the least active of the five was Facebook with 20 acquisitions. By comparison other tech firms
appear to be less inclined to rely on such transactions. For the same period, Twitter undertook 11 acquisitions,
AirBnB 10, Uber 5 and Netflix only 1. The same holds for Asian tech companies: Alibaba acquired 12, Rakuten
6, Tencent 5 and Baidu 4. Second, acquisitions by the GAFAM received much more attention because they have
strong market position and there are growing fears that mergers are used to strengthen their market power.
2Germany and Austria have recently modified their notification thresholds, including a reference to the value
of the transaction.
3In August 2019, the FTC started to investigate the motivations for the acquisitions of Instagram and What-
sApp by Facebook. https://on.wsj.com/2L88h2D
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most of the acquisitions could be classified as conglomerate mergers and, as such, they raise less
competitive concerns. However, a successful start-up may rapidly turn to a competitor of the
dominant platform. This is particularly true if the firm managed to acquire quickly a large user
base. Indeed, even if there is no obvious overlapping between products, the firm can extend its
products bundle and, with a sizable user group, turn to a significant competitor of the installed
platform. In this case, the acquisition of the firm by the dominant firm may substantially reduce
(potential) competition on the market. However, as there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the
competitive potential of the startup, the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger might be
difficult to assess ex-ante as it is notably complicated to construct an appropriate counterfactual
against which the effects of the merger should be appreciated. There is a risk of a false negative –
clearing an anticompetitive merger–, and several scholars consider that competition authorities
have underestimated that risk in their assessments (see Argentesi et al., 2019) and that they
should not only consider the risk of a type-II error but the cost of such an error (Bourreau and
de Streel, 2019).
There is a fear that the acquisition of an innovative potential entrant could be used by a
dominant platform to protect itself from the emergence of future competition. Economists use
the term ”killer acquisition” to refer to this practice. The firm acquires a firm that develops a
technology that can be used to compete with its products in the future and later shuts down
the acquired target. In this case, acquisition kills the competitive threat. Cunningham et al.
(2018) collect data on acquisition in the pharmaceutical industry. They document that 6% of
acquisition are killer acquisitions, where the acquiring firm buys a target developing a drug
similar its owns and, later, stops the development of the target’s product. Currently, there are
growing fears that mergers in the digital economy are killer mergers.
For these reasons, several recent high-profile reports from both sides of the Atlantic4 propose
reforms of the merger assessment procedure. The possible reforms include firstly, a revision of
the notification thresholds to take into account, for instance, the transaction value, the number
of affiliated users or other criteria. A change in the notification threshold is necessary to give
to competition authorities the opportunity to scrutinize the acquisition by a large platform of a
small start-up.5 Secondly, they propose to change the balance of risk to give more importance
to the potential competition exerted by the target on the acquiring platform, even if there is a
lot of uncertainty surrounding future market evolutions. For the moment, a highly uncertain
potential competition is balanced with the most likely efficiency effects. It is proposed to
give more importance to the former in the merger assessment and less importance to the latter.
Lastly, a reversal of the burden of proof is suggested. In this case and in specific circumstances, it
is the acquiring firm that has to demonstrate that the proposed acquisition has pro-competitive
effects rather than the competition authority that has to demonstrate that the mergers has a
negative impact on the market.
Despite their intense merger activities and the vivid debates they generate, little is known
about the merger strategies of the GAFAM firms. The ambition of this paper is to fill in this
gap. To that end, we collect detailed informations on the 175 M&A of the GAFAM firms during
the years 2015-2017 and on the GAFAM themselves. We focus on three main research questions.
First, we investigate whether firms acquire to reinforce their current business model or to enter
new markets. Seconds, we look at what firms do acquire: the products and the users of the
target or their assets (functionality, technology, IP, human capital). Last, we use the detailed
information we collect to check for possible killer acquisitions in the digital economy.
The GAFAM firms are at the center of an ecosystem of products and services and they are
competing on multiple markets. They however all have one or several core business. Acquisi-
tions could be used to strengthen the firm’s core business segment or to enter new segments.
4Argentesi et al. (2019), Bourreau and de Streel (2019), Cremer et al. (2019), Scott-Morton et al. (2019)
5Wollmann (2019) shows that higher thresholds are detrimental to competition as they leaded to a substantial
increase in (unscrutinized) mergers among competitors.
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In the former case, an acquisition reinforces the platform’s market position, in the latter, it
increases global competition between firms. We investigate whether M&A take place in their
core segments or in new segments. Our objective is to depart from the traditional distinc-
tion between horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers based on relatively narrow market
definitions and to propose a classification of acquisitions based on user groups.
To investigate this question, we proceed in two steps. First, we identify the most important
market segments for each GAFAM firm. We define the segments broadly according to the group
of customers for which the products are meant to be used. Six different user segments are
identified: products that are offered to advertisers, businesses, consumers, merchants, content
editors and platform products as such mainly hardwares, operating systems. For each firm, we
use the 10-K reports to determine in which user segments each of the five firms is active.
Then, we try to match, as far as possible, information on revenue streams with the corre-
sponding user segments. Given their multi-sided nature, there are segments who do not directly
generate revenues for the platform. For instance, Facebook does not directly collect revenues
from users. However, matching revenue with segments is important for identifying the revenue
or the money side of the platform. For all the GAFAM, the revenue streams are extremely
concentrated with most of the revenues coming from one or two segments: platform products
(devices) for Apple, merchants for Amazon, advertising for Facebook and Google, business and
platform products for Microsoft.
In a second step, we classify acquisitions and allocate each acquisition to one of the six
business segments. Contrary to competition authorities who have a narrow market definition,
usually by product type, we classify mergers by identifying the targeted customer group of the
acquired firm, whenever it is possible. This give us a broad picture of the GAFAM acquisitions
that allows us to tell whether GAFAM firms use M&A mainly as an instrument to strength their
core segments or whether they aim to diversify and enter new ones. The resulting classification
does not allow us to assess the pro and anti competitive effects of those acquisitions but rather
provides insights about the M&A strategy of the GAFAM firms.
Our classification reveals the following: most acquisitions are undertaken in segments in
which GAFAM firms were already active. According to our classifications, around 36 % of the
acquisitions are in the acquiring firm’s main business segment and around 82% of cases happen
in segments in which firms were active beforehand. This suggests that these firms are using
their M&A activity mostly to strengthen their current business models, and do not seek to
increase direct competition between them by entering new markets.
There are, however, 2 exceptions to these findings. The first one can be found in the segment
of products for businesses customers, in which Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Apple have
acquired substantially. This could be a sign of increasing rivalry between these firms for those
customers as Google and Amazon clearly want to compete with the market leader Microsoft.
The second exception is Google as such. Compared to the other four firms, it acquired not only
the most in absolute terms, but did so also in all of the six segments, including those in which it
was so far not extremely active. Hence, Google seems to have a more aggressive M&A strategy
and the intent to compete with all firms in most of the segments.
We further analyze the acquisition strategies of the GAFAM firms by looking at the evolution
of the target post-acquisition. We observe that in the vast majority of the cases, the acquired
brands are discontinued by the acquirer. A product is considered to be discontinued if it is
no longer supplied, maintained or upgraded under its original brand name. We observe that
in 60% of the acquisitions, the acquired products were discontinued and they remain active in
only one case over fourth.6
Product discontinuation reveals important insights on the reasons for acquisition. According
to Puranam and Srikanthfor (2007), firms can be acquired for their products and customers or
for their assets and their R&D efforts. In the former case, the product is likely to be maintained
6We were not able to find the information for 13% of the acquisitions.
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under its original brand name while in the latter case, the products is likely to be integrated
in the firm’s ecosystem. Hence, mergers motivated by asset acquisition are more likely to be
discontinued.
In order to understand better the determinants of product discontinuation, we run Probit
regressions. We find that younger firms and those in the core business segment of the acquirer
are more likely to be discontinued. This suggest that most acquisitions are undertaken to
reinforce firms’ innovation efforts by purchasing R&D efforts and talents or functionalities to be
added to their core products. Again, this could be a sign that acquisitions are used to reinforce
a business model rather than to develop competition. We also found that Apple and Facebook
have a more systematic discontinuation policy.
Finally, we investigate the question of killer acquisitions in more details. In the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, Cunningham et al. (2018) identify killer mergers in which the acquiring firm shuts
down the target because it is directly competing with its own products or R&D efforts. In the
digital economy, as an important source of value comes from network effects, the equivalent of a
killer merger would be the acquisition of a firm with a substantial user base that can eventually
turn later into a competitor of the incumbent network (Cremer et al., 2019). However, because
of network effects and switching costs, it is likely that, the acquired firm will continue to operate
under its initial brand name. Keeping the product under its original name is a way to preserve
the user base while integrating it in a larger ecosystem. Furthermore, it is not in the interest of
the platform to do so if the user bases overlap (Prat and Valletti, 2019). Hence, contrary to the
pharmaceutical industry, in the digital economy, a killer merger would not necessarily lead to
the discontinuation of the product’s brand. Rather, if the product’s value is based on its user
basis, we should observe the opposite.
Based on the preceding discussion, we try to identify potential mergers in the killer zone
by looking at products that satisfy three conditions. They should be (1) in the core segment
of the acquirer, (2) continued under the original brand name after acquisition and (3) have a
substantial user base, preferably overlapping with the current user base of the acquirer. Based
on these criteria, we found only one potential killer merger, between Facebook and Masquerade,
that would have deserved a more detailed investigation by competition watchdogs.
We now review the literature on mergers in the digital economy. To our knowledge, there
is no systematic analysis of the merger activity of the main digital platforms. The report by
Argentesi et al. (2019) is an exception. It makes a critical assessment of several merger decisions
taken by the Competition Market Authority (UK) in the digital economy and it suggests reforms
for better taking into account the specificities of digital markets.
There are few papers that explicitly consider the striking features of the digital economy
in a merger model. Prat and Valletti (2019) develop a model of attention oligopoly in which
platforms that may look like a priori different are competing with each other for the attention
of the targeted consumers, attention that will be sold to the advertisers and retailers. In this
context, they consider merger between two competing networks and they show that the larger
the overlap between the user bases , the larger are the welfare losses resulting from the merger
i.e. a merger between overlapping networks is more detrimental than a merger from dissociated
networks. Hence, a merger between two networks offering different products to the same groups
of users can be used to restrict substantially competition on the market, even if the products
offered to capture the consumers’ attention are different.
Cabral (2018) develop a model where tech giants (technological leaders) are competing with
fringe firms. The focus of the model is on innovation and the impact of mergers on incentives to
innovate.7 Cabral distinguishes radical from incremental innovations and he shows that mergers
favors incremental innovation but decreases radical innovation. The idea is that incremental
7A merger changes the incentives to innovate of both insiders and outsiders to the merger. Several recent
papers focused on the impact of mergers on innovation incentives (see for instance Motta and Tarentino, 2017;
Federico et al., 2018; Bourreau and Jullien, 2018).
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innovation has more value if it is transferred to the dominant firm and a merger is a way to do
so. Anticipating a transfer, the startup partially internalizes the full benefit of its innovation
and it has more incentives to invest. On the contrary, startups have less incentives to invest
in radical innovations that would allow them to replace the dominant firm. The reason is that
increasing the benefit of incremental innovation also increases the opportunity cost of a radical
innovation. Therefore, a merger may boost investment but it also reinforce the dominance of
the incumbent. Bryan and Hovenkamp (2019) reach a similar conclusion. They develop a model
of startup acquisitions by dominant firms where startups innovate and develop components to
be used by a tech giant. They show that technological leaders have more incentives to buy the
startups to maintain their leadership and that this persistence of leadership through acquisition
may not be welfare improving. Furthermore, startups may biased their research efforts towards
the improvement of the technological leader, thereby reinforcing its leadership.
Complementarities are important in digital economy as many startups develop products
or features that are complements to the platform’s ecosystem. Wen and Zhu (2019) show
that the entry threat of the platform in a complementary market changes the incentives to
innovate and the pricing strategy of the complementor. Rather than entry, a platform can buy
the complementor to expand its ecosystem. Etro (2019) shows that such a merger between
complements increases the innovation effort, as it solves the Cournot complement problem but
it restricts competition by making entry less likely.
Finally, at a more macro level, it is now well documented that there is a rise in market power
due to increased industry concentration (De Loecker et al., 2019). Pelligrino (2019) attributes
this increased industry concentration can be attributed to the rise of startup takeovers by
dominant firms, particularly in innovative sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the data source in Section 2. Section 3
presents the business model of the platform, the users group gravitating around it and the
main revenues sources. Section 4 provides detailed information on the merger activities of the
GAFAM firms for the years 2015-2017. Section 5 reviews the M&A activity of each of the
GAFAM. Section 6 analyzes the product continuation decision. Section 7 looks at potential
killer merger and Section 8 concludes.
2 Data source
To structure the activities and products of the GAFAM firms we rely on their 10-K filings.
These are annual reports each listed company in the U.S. has to publish. They contain an
overview of the firms businesses and financial situation.8 We use the 10-K reports of 2014 in
order to get a first-hand assessment of firms situation before our sample period of 2015-2017.
Thereby, we use their descriptions in part 1, item 1 of these reports, in which companies have
to describe their activities, their subsidiaries as well as their products and markets.
To know about the acquisitions undertaken by the GAFAM firms and the acquired compa-
nies, we use the Crunchbase database.9 This is an online database tracking the tech sector and
its companies. It gets its information through a huge network of partnerships with venture cap-
ital firms, executives, entrepreneurs and investors. Furthermore, it collects information though
algorithmic web searching.
Through this database we check acquisitions undertaken by the GAFAM firms as well as
their subsidiaries for which the announcement date falls within the years 2015, 2016 and 2017.
We drop 3 cases in which the firms bought specific assets from other companies or in which they
just hired a single person from another company. From the database we collect information on
targets age, origin, activities and products, the number of funding rounds they realized before




We check and complement this information with press releases and public statements of
involved companies, as well as press articles covering these acquisition cases. This allows us to
verify the information from Crunchbase and to check the evolution of target firms and their
products after they have been acquired. This results in a total sample of 175 cases for the 3
years under investigation.. In order to evaluate the relative importance of their activities we
use information on revenue streams contained in part 2 items 6 and 8 of the 10-K files.
3 The GAFAM firms
3.1 Multi-sided Platforms
The GAFAM firms are multi-sided platforms enabling interactions and value creation among
multiple groups of users. They constitute an ecosystem where multiple players are gravitating
around. We represent a schematic view of the platform in Figure 1. We identify five different
groups of users interacting on the platform. Notice that a single entity can play different roles,





Figure 1: GAFAM as platforms
Advertisers: Use the platform to reach potential clients. They want to place and target online adver-
tising on the internet. Advertisers are corporate firms, organizations or institutions.
Businesses: Use the platform to increase their productivity and their organizational functioning. They
want to use the products and services offered by the platform to increase their own produc-
tive or creative processes. Business customers are corporate firms, however, since many
of these products are offered in a customer version or on a Freemium basis, their might
as well be available to end-users.
Merchants: Use the platform as an online distribution system. They want to sell physical goods over
the internet. Companies as well as end-users may act as merchants.
Content editors: They create digital content and use the platform to make it accessible to users. They need
development support and platforms to reach users.10 Again, both corporate firms as well
as end-users may act as content providers and editors.
Consumers: Use digital devices to navigate the internet and its content. Need products and services
to access and use the internet. Only end-users act as consumers.
Platforms: Create interaction within and between the different groups of users. For that, they develop
products and services to operate the platform and to create interactions. These products
10As digital content, we consider streaming or downloading of music, videos, ebooks or applications. Among
content editors we count also online stores for digital content, for instance: an app store, or an ebook store.
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and services include hardware, operating systems and interfaces which are the technical
backbones of the platform.
The segments we define regroup products that are targeted at the same user groups. For
instance, the segment for advertisers regroups all products and services that allow advertisers
to place, serve and target advertising on the internet.
As these firms and their products often operate as multi-sided platforms, by nature, they
serve more than one single user group. Eventually, each product is meant to link a given user
group to end-users. As in the example of advertising services, which are meant to link advertisers
to potential consumers.
Nevertheless, we define each segment based on one user group. We base this allocation of
products on the descriptions and explanations provided by the GAFAM firms in their 10-K
reports. We thereby ensure a consistent treatment of similar products.
Table 1 shows the 6 segments we define, the concerned user groups as well as examples of
products within each segment.
Table 1: User Groups, Segments and Products
User Group Segment Product Examples
Advertisers Advertising Advertising networks, auctions, serving technology,
targeting services
Businesses Business Cloud services, productivity software, collaboration
tools, analytics software, CRM and sales software




Content Development tools for apps, music, videos, or games,
online stores for content like app stores, music stream-
ing
Consumers Consumer Search engines, web browsers, social media, messen-
gers, map services
Platform Platform Devices like smartphones, laptops, other wearables,
operating systems and interfaces
3.2 Main segments of the GAFAM
Platforms create value by offering products and services designed for each category of users and
by enabling interactions between them. In a first step, we identify the segments in which each
firm is operating i.e. the users in the above categories they serve.
The classification of economic activities requires a complete knowledge of the products and
services of those firms, at a given point in time. For that, we use the detailed information
contained in the 10-K reports. These reports are written by the firms themselves and they
give a complete view on the firms’ activities at a given moment. We attempt to categorize the
different products and services of the GAFAMs according to the targeted customers. By doing
so, we assess which firm is active in which segment. We base this allocation of products on the
descriptions and explanations provided by the GAFAM firms in their 10-K reports. We thereby
ensure a consistent treatment of similar products. Since we are interested in the acquisitions
of 2015 to 2017, we use the 10-K reports of the year 2014 to classify the GAFAM’s product
portfolios and the associated income.
The following table reports the segments in which the firms were active in 2014. The table
reveals that firms are active in multiple segments but that none of them was in 2014 serving all
of them.
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Table 2: Active Segments of the GAFAM, year 2014
Segment AMZN APPL FCBK GOOG MSFT
Advertising X X X
Businesses X X X
Merchants X X
Content X X X X X
Consumers X X X X
Platform X X X X
3.3 Revenue sources of the GAFAM
Next we identify the main revenue sources of firms. Our objective is to link as far as possible
revenues to the user segments. Thereby, we label the segment that generates more than half of
all revenues as the core segment of that firm.
Two aspects hinder a precise link between segments and revenue streams. First, firms do
not represent their revenue information according to the 6 user segments defined above. Even
worse, the structure employed varies among firms and over time.
Second, all of the 5 firms operate to some extent as multi-sided platforms. And this role is
usually not limited to a single one of their products. Rather, the ecosystem of interlinked and
connected products each firm offers acts as platform for various user groups. As a consequence,
the success of a product is not independent from other, complementary products within this
ecosystem.
This is especially pronounced when one considers the core segments of Google and Facebook.
In contrast to Amazon, Apple and Microsoft, they derive little direct revenues from their popular
consumer products and services. Since these are often free of charge for end-users, these firms
generate revenues by selling users attention to advertisers. Therefore, when identifying core
segments, one cannot ignore the consumers side, although the bulk of revenues for both firms
is generated through advertising. We label thus both segments, advertisers and consumers, as
core segment for Google and Facebook.
This represents naturally an approximation and is not to be taken as precise and com-
plete distinction between revenue streams. Rather, this serves as an illustrative exercise of the
importance of firms’ products and segments.
The following tables (Table 3 to 7) report for each firm the main sources of income for the
year 2014. In each table, the right-hand column displays the revenue streams indicated by firms
in their 10-K filings, as well as the relative importance in terms of total revenues.11 These
are matched with the products generating them in the middle column. The left-hand column
indicates then the user segment in which these products are assigned. We report in bold the
main income segments for each firm, i.e. their core segments.
3.3.1 Amazon
Table 3 reports the revenue streams and the corresponding segments for Amazon in 2014.
Amazon derives revenues from all the 4 segments where it is active. The company distinguish
11For some cases, these revenue streams might be regrouped in order to fit our segmentation.
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two main sources of revenues: those coming from the sales of goods (merchants), media (editors)
and the devices it produces (platform) and those from the sales of digital services, mainly cloud
services for business. Online sales represents the largest revenue stream accounting for more
than 93% of the generated income. Although we cannot distinguish precisely between these 3
segments, it appears clear that the merchant segment accounted for the vast majority of these
revenues. In 2014, the revenues from the Kindle (platform) were about $ 4 billion (4.4%)12 and
those from Prime were around $ 2.7 billion (3%).13





Shopping websites: amazon.com, ama-
zon.fr, etc.; ‘Marketplace’ platform (On-




‘Kindle’ e-readers, ‘Fire’ TVs, ‘Echo’
Speakers
Content
‘Prime’ (among other things, access to TV
shows and movies); ‘Kindle Store’ (Sale of
digital books)
Business
‘AWS’ Cloud offerings, ‘WorkDocs’ pro-
ductivity suite, ‘WorkMail’ collaboration
tools
5,597 6.29%
Source: Amazon’s 2014 10-K filings, p.27
Amounts in million $.
3.3.2 Apple
Table 4 shows the revenues for Apple. Apple is active in 5 segments, the most important one
being the platform segment. Apple distinguishes separately the revenues generated by each of
its main devices but since these are all part of the platform segment we display them together.
The sale of these devices generates more than 90% of the income. To increase the value of its
devices, Apple offers tools to users and content providers. Those segments, that the company




1310-K filings of 2016, p. 68
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‘iPhone’ phones, ‘iPad’ tablets; ‘Mac’ lap-
tops; other devices (watches, keyboards,
etc.); ‘IOS’ operating systems
164,732 90.12%
Content
‘AppStore’ for mobile application;
‘iTunes’ for music; ‘iBooks’ for digital
books 18,063 9.88%
Merchants ‘ApplePay’ mobile payment system
Business ‘iWork’ productivity suite
Customers ‘Safari’ web browser; ‘Facetime’,
‘Message’ communication tools; ‘Map’
navigation services
Souce: Apple’s 2014 10-K filings, p. 27.
Amounts in million $.
3.3.3 Facebook
Facebook is active in three segments, advertising, content and consumers. By offering tools and
service to consumers and editors, the social network generates trafic and monetizes the trafic by
advertising. As mentioned before, since these ads are sold on its consumer services, we qualify
both segments as core. Table 5 shows that in 2014, Facebook’s revenues almost entirely came
from advertising. A minor part of revenues was generated through the sale of online content
(online games) on its social network.





‘Facebook’ social network and messenger;








Offers online content like games through
its social network services
974 7.81%
Source: Facebook’s 2014 10-K filings, p.43
Amounts in million $.
3.3.4 Google
Google is active in 4 segments, editors, consumers and advertising as Facebook and, in addition,
in the platform segment. Table 6 indicates that the vast majority of its revenues was generated
through the sale of advertising for consumers. Given the importance of end-users, not as a
source of income but to generate income, we refer to the consumer segment as core.
Products for consumers, editors and the platform itself (mainly Android) aim at generating
trafic for advertisement. The other revenues were mainly generated by the sale of online content
on YouTube and Play Store. Furthermore, some minor revenues came from the sale of platform
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software and hardware.





‘Google’ search engine & vertical search
engines; ‘Google Maps’ mapping and nav-
igation services; ‘Chrome’ browser
0 0%
Advertising




development tools; ‘YouTube’ video plat-
form; ‘PlayStore’ for books, games, apps
6,945 10.52%
Platform
‘Android’ mobile operating system;
‘Nexus’ phones
Source: Google’s 2014 10-K filings, p.45
Amounts in million $.
3.3.5 Microsoft
Microsoft is active in all segments expect the merchant one. The revenue structure is less concen-
trated with two important segments, the business and the platform. The revenue information
of Microsoft in table 7 shows that its business products like cloud services and productivity
suites were its core segment in 2014 generating 57% of the income. The platform software and
devices generates 34.5% of the income. The remaining revenues were generated by the sale of
development tools for content creators as well as advertising revenues on its Bing search engine.





‘Azure’, ‘Office 365’ Cloud services;
‘Excel’, ‘Word’, ‘Powerpoint’ productiv-




‘Windows’ operating system; ‘Surface’




Development tools for content and game
creators
7,258 8.63%
Consumer ‘Bing’ search engine
Advertising Advertising services
Source: Microsoft’s 2014 10-K filings, p.28.
Amounts in million $.
3.3.6 Summary
To summarize, figure 2 displays the revenue streams of 2014 for the five firms. In case multiple
segments are responsible for a particular revenue share, we chose to represent the most impor-
tant one in this figure. The figure shows that revenues are extremely concentrated. For all
firms except Microsoft, there is a single segment who generates more than 80% of the revenue.
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Microsoft has two important sources of revenues, platform products and the business segment,
with the later being the largest income source. Finally, there is no firm that generates substan-
tial income directly from the service it offers to end-users. Consumers are offered services to
generate traffic on the platform and sell them online content, goods and devices or expose them
to advertising.
Differences between the firms can be observed at the amount of revenue each firm was able
to create. Whereas Amazon, Google and Microsoft had somewhat similar revenue amounts,
Apple and Facebook have respectively a much higher and much lower revenues than the other
three firms. These differences might reflect the distinct activities of firms (i.e. manufacturing of
hardware devices for Apple vs. pure software services for Facebook). Alternatively, they might
be a result of the differences in age of companies.
Finally, it should be noted that revenue is not profit. Some segments may generate high
income but low profits or the reverse. It is well documented in the financial press that the
contribution to Amazon’s profit of AWS is larger than its contribution to income. However,
it is not possible to allocate profits to segments as none of the companies publish such an
information. The following table report the profit of the GAFAM for the year 2014, in absolute
value and relative to revenues. Interestingly, with the exception of Amazon who was making
losses in 2014 but who turned to profits since then, all the firms have a comparable ratio of profit
to income in the range of 20-25%. This huge profitability is another sign of the importance of
the GAFAM in the digital economy.
Table 8: GAFAM profits for 2014






Profits in million US$.
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Figure 2: GAFAM Revenues 2014
4 Acquisitions Cases
4.1 Overall Summary Statistics
We review 175 acquisition cases for the years 2015, 2016, 2017. The list of cases is available in
Appendix A. We collect several information about these acquisitions as well as the target firms.
Table 9 represents some summary statistics about the cases. More statistics are provided in
Appendix B.
Panel 9a shows the number of acquisitions in total, per firm and year. Microsoft and Google
were by far the most active in terms of number of acquisitions with 52 and 40 case respectively,
whereas Facebook was the least with 20 acquisitions. In our short sample period, 2015 was the
busiest year for those companies, acquiring 65 companies that year.
Panel 9b indicates the origin of target companies. We regrouped countries of origin in 3
classes. Most were located in the United States, 47 were active in the European Union, and 26
in other parts of the world like Canada, Israel, India.
Panel 9c shows some statistics on the distribution of target companies’ age, their number of
funding rounds and the amount of capital raised before being acquired. One can see that the
GAFAM firms were mostly buying rather small and young technology companies, with some
outliers of more experienced firms. The median acquired firm is aged four years, completed two
funding rounds and collected $7 millions.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics
(a) Number and Years of Acquisitions
2015 2016 2017 Total:
GOOG 18 20 14 52
MSFT 18 11 11 40
APPL 12 8 13 33
AMZN 9 8 13 30
FCBK 8 8 4 20
Total: 65 55 55 175
(b) Origin of Target Firms
Region US EU Rest of the World Unknown
No. of Targets 110 30 26 9
(c) Numeric Variables
Min. Median Mean Max. NA’s
Age 0.00 4.00 6.09 39.00 1
No. Fund. Rounds 1.00 2.00 2.66 10.00 56
Amount (in thous. US$) 15.00 7,000.00 23,794.48 460,000.00 72
4.2 Classification of acquisitions by segments
In addition to these statistic, we collect information on the target company business and prod-
ucts. Similar to the products of the GAFAM firms, we assign each target company to a specific
segment according to its product and targeted user group. All reviewed acquisition cases with
their corresponding classifications can be found in the appendix. The intention is to match the
acquisitions with the segments of the buying firm.
Figure 3 shows our classification of acquisitions by segments. In 19 cases, we were unable
to identify a segment for the acquired firm due to unavailable or unclear information. The two
most important segments are the business one with 61 acquisitions and the editors one with
43. By contrast, there are few acquisitions in the advertising and the merchant segments, with
respectively 1 and 5 cases.
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Figure 3: Acquisitions by segment
5 A review of the GAFAM acquisitions
In the following, we take a closer look at the segments in which each GAFAM firm undertook
its acquisitions and what kind of companies they acquired. For each firm we display the number
of acquisitions per segments. We describe what kind of targets were acquired and how these
cases relate to the business descriptions and revenue streams in the 10-K filings of the firms.
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5.1 Acquisitions by segments
5.1.1 Amazon
Figure 4: Acquisitions by segments, Amazon
In the period under consideration, Amazon has undertaken 30 different acquisitions. As can
be seen in figure 4, Amazon acquired the most in the segments of businesses, merchants and
editors. All three are segments in which Amazon already operated successfully prior to the start
of our period. Segments of less importance to its M&A strategy were consumers with 4, and
platform with 1 acquisition. In 1 cases, targets could not be allocated into a segment.
In the merchant segment, Amazon made 8 acquisitions. 6 aim at extending the bundle of
services provided by purchasing distribution systems, shopping websites and online payment
systems. 2 of these acquisitions were vertical merger with brick-and-mortar retail firms. One
concerned the take-over of ’Whole Foods’, a food chain in the U.S., the other was the purchase
of Indian book publisher and retailer ’Westland’.
There are 9 acquisitions in the business segment. Acquisitions in this segment concerned
cloud services as well as productivity software, analytics and cyber security software. 7 acqui-
sitions were undertaken in the segment for content editors and creators. These were mostly
development services for mobile apps, videos and games. Additionally, Amazon acquired an on-
line gaming as well as a video platform. 4 acquisitions occurred in the segment for consumers.
1 was a personal assistant product. The other 3 were different search engines, 2 of them being
specialized in finding products on the internet. The other one was a search engine for videos.
Hence, even if Amazon was not active in this segment beforehand, these acquisitions seem more
aimed at improving its current products for merchants and content, rather than a full grown
entry attempt. Lastly, a single acquisition took place in the platform segment. This concerned
a manufacturer of security cameras.
In general, these figures reflect a rather strong focus on its already successful product lines.
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Besides bolstering its core activity of online shopping, it seems to have further strengthened
its online content offerings. Furthermore, the substantial acquisitions in the business segment
accompanied the considerable revenue growth (from $5,5 billion in 2014 to $17,5 billion in 2017)
generated by its AWS and business offerings. We can therefore conclude that Amazon used the
acquisitions to strength its core business and to develop the services offered to the business
segment.
5.1.2 Apple
Figure 5: Acquisitions by segments, Apple
Figure 5 shows the 33 acquisitions of Apple. With 12 cases, most of them occurred in the
platform segment. 8 acquisitions were allocated to the business segment. The editors as well
as the consumers segments are represented with 7 and 6 cases respectively.
Among the acquisitions in the platform segment, which represents its core activity, Apple
bought companies developing hardware components like cameras, semiconductors or wireless
chargers. Furthermore, it acquired security software for devices, interfaces like face recognition
and keyboard software as well as software and hardware technology for virtual reality devices.
From the 8 cases in the business segment, 6 were data analytics companies. The cases attributed
to the editors segment were purchases of development and management tools for music, podcasts
and videos. 6 acquisitions occurred in the segment for consumers. These were navigation and
mapping services, health software and a picture editing application. One acquisition concerned
the purchase of a social media application specialized in virtual reality images.
For Apple again, these numbers seem to indicate that the company is using its M&A activity
to reinforce its current business model. Platform hard- and software represents its main revenue
source and simultaneously the segment in which it acquired the most. Whereas the digital
content offered by content editors and providers constitute a major reason for end-users to
purchase its devices. In the same logic, the acquisitions in consumer services can be seen as
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an effort to further increase the attractiveness of these devices through improved pre-installed
services. The acquisitions in the business segment do not necessarily fit this pattern well,
given that products and services for companies and organizations are not among Apple’s main
revenue sources. In its 2017 10-K reports, Apple does not mention any increased importance or
revenues from these services. Whether these mergers express growing ambitions in this segment
or whether the acquired technology in data analytics is meant to be used for other purposes
remains unclear.
5.1.3 Facebook
Figure 6: Acquisitions by segments, Facebook
The segments in which Facebook undertook its 20 acquisitions are shown in figure 6. Most of
these cases took place in the editors segment with 8 acquisitions. Other prominent segments are
the ones for consumers, 5 cases, and platforms, 5 cases. A single acquisition took place in the
business segment. Whereas editors and consumers are among the regular users of Facebook,
platforms and business services are new to the firm. 1 acquisition cases could not be attributed
to a segment.
Reflecting its natural core activity, 3 cases were purchases of social media and sharing
applications in the consumers segment. Furthermore, Facebook acquired a target developing
personal assistant software. The 8 acquisitions in the editors segment are composed of purchases
of video streaming technology and content management services for publishers. Moreover,
within these 7 cases, 2 were purchases of virtual reality and artificial intelligence software
for developers. Facebook’s acquisitions in platforms were hardware components for virtual
reality devices. Finally, by acquiring a customer relations software, the company undertook an
acquisition in the business segment.
Classifying Facebook’s acquisitions according to segments reveals that it used its M&A
activity for two reasons. First, by acquiring in consumer services, mostly social media apps,
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its strengthens the non-money side of its core business. Furthermore, the acquisitions in the
services for content editors and providers can be seen in a close relation to the attractiveness
of its social services. The acquired technology facilitates the provision of content via its social
networks. By providing more content on its social networks, Facebook keeps the consumers
within its ecosystem and it can monetize the time spent on the platform.
A second motivation for its acquisitions lies in Facebook’s move into VR hardware and
software.14 This constitutes an entry into a new segment for the firm, which so far did not
develop, manufacture or sell any platform devices. Facebook wants to position itself as the
leader in VR but this new form of connectivity can be an attempt to generate additional trafic
on its platform.
5.1.4 Google
Figure 7: Acquisitions by segments, Google
The 52 acquisitions of Google represent the broadest M&A activity as it undertook transactions
in all of the 6 segments shown in figure 7. Most of these segments are well known to Google.
Those are the segments of advertisers, editors, consumers and platforms, with 1, 17, 11 and 5
cases respectively. However, acquisitions in merchants, 1 case, and especially business, 14 cases,
represent new forms of activity to Google.
Acquisitions in services for advertisers as well as the 11 acquisitions in the consumers seg-
ment can be seen as investments in its most important fields of activities. These consumer
cases were mapping and navigation services, photo editing and storage software as well as web
browser add-ons. 2 cases within this segment were purchases of social media apps. Within
the editors segment, 9 cases were development tools for mobile applications and monetization
services for content providers. In the same segment, 4 cases were purchases game developers, a
14An evolution launched through M&A activity by Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of ‘Oculus’.
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podcast platform and an ebook online shop. The 14 acquisitions in the business segment were
purchases of cloud services, productivity software and professional communication products. In
the platform segment, it acquired an operating system software, hardware technology and a VR
interface software. A single one of its acquisitions took place in the merchants segment where it
acquired a mobile payment system. However, this application can be used by other user groups.
This broad M&A strategy might suggest vast ambitions. Indeed, similar to Facebook, Google
seems to consider mergers not only as a means to support its main activities and products. The
12 acquisitions in consumer and advertising services are clearly meant to bolster its main source
of revenue. Similarly, the 17 mergers with content editors or acquisitions of services for them
reflect the importance of content and applications available through its online services and
Android platform. However, the 14 acquisitions in the business segment represent an attempt
of entry into a new segment. Although not yet generating important revenue streams, these
acquisitions seemed to have contributed to the rapid setup of productivity suites, cloud services
and other products for corporate customers.
5.1.5 Microsoft
Figure 8: Acquisitions by segments, Microsoft
With 40 cases, Microsoft was the most active when it comes to numbers of acquisitions. The
segments in which it acquired are shown in figure 8. The company undertook by far most of
its acquisitions in the business segment. 26 cases fall within this segment. For the rest cases
occurred in the segments for editors, consumers and the platform segment.
The cases in the business segment were purchases of cloud services, productivity software,
management software like CRM or sales software, analytics technology and professional com-
munication products. Of the 8 cases in the editors segment, most concerned development tools
for applications and games. Other cases are purchases of game content, a gaming streaming
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platform and music streaming platform. The 3 acquisitions in platform technology were key-
board software and device accessories. Finally, the 2 cases in the consumer segment was an
acquisition of a virtual reality social network and a picture sharing application.
The purpose of M&A for Microsoft is easy to see. Not only has it invested substantially
in acquisitions of other companies, but the vast majority took place in its core segment of
products and services for business clients. This massive activity in this segment, especially
cloud services and productivity suites seems to be an important strategic instrument in its
attempted refocusing on certain products. Other acquisitions are also meant to bolster existing
product lines of the company. For instance, the cases involving content editors relate to its
Xbox and gaming offerings. Similarly, it used acquisitions to improve its platform offerings.
The only case that could suggest a deviation from this general pattern, is the acquisition of
a virtual reality social network. Even if the exact purpose of this acquisition is beyond our
knowledge, this single acquisition does not suggest that Microsoft would use acquisitions as a
major instrument to enter into new segments.
5.2 Summary
From the preceding discussions, it is apparent that firms use acquisitions to reinforce their
business model. Our evidence show that firms are massively acquiring in their core segments or
in the segments that are complementary to the core one. This does not suggest that competition
between firms intensifies but rather that firms use mergers to reinforce their most successful
products where they already enjoy a strong market position.
For the acquisitions in the non core segments, we observe three interesting features. First
Amazon, Facebook, Google and Apple are acquiring substantially tools for editors. For Amazon
with its ”Prime” offer and Google with its paid version of its video service Youtube Premium,
those acquisitions help to develop this segment as such and to compete for audience with other
firms e.g. Netflix. For Facebook, Apple and to some extent Google, acquisitions seem to be
more a way to attract traffic and make their core products more attractive. Second, we observe
substantial acquisitions by Apple, Google and Amazon in the business segment. Acquisition by
Apple are mainly data analytics company and the firm did not develop so far a specific offer
for business clients. On the other hand, Google and Amazon want to develop their business
segments and compete with the dominant firm, Microsoft, for those consumers. Acquisitions is
a way to reinforce their product supply and to compete with Microsoft. Third, we observe that
Google and to a lesser extent, Amazon have the more diversified acquisition profile and they
clearly want to extend their activities beyond their core business.
Finally, when we look at the informations regarding the age and funding obtained by the
targets (see Appendix B), we notice important differences in the firms’ strategies. With an
average of 4.05 years for Facebook and 4.42 for Google, they both acquired companies sub-
stantially younger companies than Apple (average age of 6.52), Amazon (8.00) and Microsoft
(7.00).15 Facebook and Google acquires mostly young startups while Amazon and Microsoft
buy more established firms and this strategy seems to be stable over time. This information is
further confirmed when we look at the number of funding rounds and the amount of venture
capital collected. Firms acquired by Facebook and Google have completed less funding rounds
and collected less funds, in average, than those acquired by Amazon and Microsoft. All the
indicators suggest that Facebook and Google buy companies at earlier stage of development
than the other firms, especially Amazon and Microsoft. Acquisition of younger firms are more
likely to be motivated by the acquisition of the firm’s assets rather than by its product. We
investigate this question further in the next section.
15In a recent report (Argentesi et al., 2019) reviewing the acquisitions of Facebook, Google and Amazon since
2008, the authors found similar patterns with Facebook acquiring younger firms (average age 3.7 years) than
Google (4.4 years) and Amazon (6.5 years).
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6 Evolution of the target firms and products
The objective of this section is to see what happen to the acquired products and by doing so,
have a more precise information on the motivations for acquisitions. After an acquisition, the
targets product might continue to be offered under its original name and brand. In this case,
the motives for the acquisition could have been the users (or user growth) the product was able
to attract and might continue to do so. In contrast, should the product and its brand disappear
or being integrated in the firm’s ecosystem, various possible motivations are conceivable. The
acquiring firm could have wanted to add some functionality of the acquired product to its own
products. In this case, the product might continue to exist, but under a different brand, name
and layout. Additionally, intellectual property or other technological know-how might have been
the driver of the acquisition. Finally, the transaction could be qualified as a so-called acqui-hire,
if the main objective was to add engineers, programmers or other high-quality employees to the
company.
The integration of firms post-acquisition can be revealing about the rationales that were
behind the transaction in the first place. Puranam and Srikanthfor (2007) argue that acquiring
firms can be interested in target companies either for ”what they know or for what they do”. If
acquirers are mainly motivated by the knowledge stock (technology, IP or human resources) of
a target i.e. what they know, they will fully integrate it into their own processes. On the other
hand, if the acquirer wants to use the target as an additional source of innovation i.e. what
they do, it will keep it running as a separated entity.
We cannot access information on the structural and organizational integration of target
firms. However, we use a similar reasoning than Puranam and Srikanthfor (2007) to verify the
evolution of targets brands. If the product is discontinued under its original brand, the acquirer
is likely to be more interested by the knowledge and the technology. If it is continued under its
original brand, the main motivation is more likely to be the product in itself and its users. The
evolution of the products reveals information about the motivation for the acquisition.
To assess whether a target’s product brand was discontinued or kept running after a trans-
action we checked the companies’ websites as well as press articles covering the acquisition. We
consider a product to be discontinued if:
• Firms announce the product shutdown themselves.
• The website of the product or company is taken down.
• The website is still working but there are no product offerings anymore.
• The website is still working and offering products but companies announced that support
for these products has stopped and/or no updates will be provided.
Panel (a) of figure 9 displays the overall share of discontinued brands post-transaction. 105
brands of target firms were discontinued within a year after the acquisition. Representing 60% of
all cases, these are the vast majority. In 47 the targets’ products remained active and continued
to be offered just as before the acquisition. In 23 cases, or 13%, there were not enough or no
clear information about the target’s product. This can be seen as indication that GAFAM firms
are often not interested in the market performance of the firms and products, but rather by
their knowledge.
Panel (b) of figure 9 represents the share of discontinued product brands for each firm.
Apple shuts down the most products. In 26 out of 33 cases, the target’s product disappeared in
its initial form after the transaction. This reflects Apple’s choice of a closed system of products.
Given that Apple acquired mostly in its core segments, the many discontinued products may
hint that Apple wants to improve its existing products. Or that it wants to develop new products
in these segments internally instead of adding ”full-grown” products to its ecosystem. A similar
pattern emerges for Facebook.
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Figure 9: Running vs. discontinued products
Panel (a): all acquisitions
Panel (b): acquisitions by firms
Amazon, Google and Microsoft, however, keep between 27% and 37% of targets’ products
up and running. For Amazon and Microsoft this could mean that they want to diversify their
products within their segments. For Google it might as well be a consequence of its rather
expansive M&A strategy. When entering new segments, an acquirer could have higher incentives
to keep acquired products on the market.
To investigate this question further, we run a Probit regression to explain the drivers of
the product discontinuation’s decision. In the estimations, we remove the firms for which the
decision cannot be assess. Results of the Probit estimations and the LPM estimations with
robust standard errors are presented in Table 10. In the table, we report the average marginal
effects.
The estimations show that younger firms are less likely to be continued. Indeed, younger
startups are more likely to be bought for their knowledge rather than for their products and
shutdown is therefore more likely. The coefficient for an acquisition in the core segment is
positive and significant. The firms are more likely to stop a product when it is part of their
core segment. So the acquisitions in the core segment are likely to be knowledge driven while
acquisitions outside the core segment are more likely to be product driven. Conversely, they are
less likely to discontinue a product acquired in the non core segment in which there are active.
Apple, Facebook and Amazon are more likely to shut down the products they acquired,
with a more significant effect for Apple and Facebook, as the descriptive statistics illustrated.
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Table 10: Probit (Average Marginal Effects) + LPM (robust standard errors)
Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM
(Intercept) 0.01 0.54∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.12 0.65∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Age −0.01∗ −0.01? −0.01∗ −0.01? −0.01∗ −0.01?
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
GOOG 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.14
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
AMZN 0.18∗ 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.21∗∗ 0.24?
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13)
FCBK 0.23∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.19∗ 0.22? 0.22∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14)
APPL 0.30∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
Core 0.21∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.20∗ 0.20∗







AIC 178.79 178.92 174.61
BIC 199.91 200.04 201.77
Log Likelihood −82.40 −82.46 −78.31
Deviance 164.79 164.92 156.61
Num. obs. 151 151 151
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ?p < 0.1
Finally, adding a dummy for the acquisition year, we observe that more recents acquisitions are
more likely to be continued (so far).
7 Killer Acquisitions
Finally, we use our data to search for a possible killer acquisition, that is the acquisition of a
potential competitor of the acquirer. Such an acquisition could impede future competition on
the market and competition watchdogs are more and more concerned by the existence of such
a merger.
In the digital economy, a firm that managed to attract a large user can extend its product
bundle and turn to a sizable competitor of an existing platform, even if products are a priori
different. Identifying as we did, products segments by user groups rather than by functionality
is an interesting tool to identify potential competitors of the incumbents’ platform. A sizable
network within the core segment could be a competitive threat to the incumbent even if products
are different. So, a first condition to identify a potential killer merger is to have an acquisition
in the firm’s core segment where the acquirer enjoys a strong market position.
Second, the target firm should be a potential competitor and for that, it must have a
sufficiently large user base. Firms that develop software, applications or devices but that have
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not yet attracted users cannot be considered as potential competitors of the incumbent. As
multihoming is pervasive in the digital economy, the overlapping between user bases is an
important aspect to determine the effects to competition of a merger. As shown by Prat and
Valletti (2019), the negative effect of a merger depends on the overlapping of the user bases;
mergers being more detrimental when a larger share of users overlap. So, it is important to
have a large and preferably overlapping user base.
Last, the product of the target should be continued. As we argued above, when the firm is
interested in the assets of the target, especially in its core segment, products are more likely to
be discontinued. Conversely, if the firm is interested in the product and the users, the product
should be continued under its initial brand name. When a firm has a large user base, changing
its brand name, may move consumers away, especially if there are network effects, switching
costs and brand loyalty. For these reasons, a sizable competitor is likely to continue to operate
under its pre-acquisition name.16
In the following table, we identify all the acquisition in the core segments that have been
continued under their initial brand name. There are few (12) acquisitions that fits those two
criteria and most of them are complement to the existing products of the acquirer.
Acquirer Target Segment Product Funding
1 AMZN Souq Merchants retail website 460,000,000.00
2 MSFT LinkedIn Businesses prof soc network 154,800,000.00
3 MSFT 6Wunderkinder / Wunderlist Businesses productivity 34,983,889.00
4 MSFT Event Zero Businesses collaboration tool add-on 13,750,000.00
5 MSFT Sunrise Businesses productivity 8,220,410.00
6 GOOG AIMatter Consumers picture editing 2,000,000.00
7 FCBK Masquerade Consumers sharing app 1,000,000.00
8 MSFT Cycle Computing Businesses cloud 1,000,000.00
9 AMZN Whole Foods Market Merchants supermarket
10 AMZN WING Merchants delivery service
11 MSFT Mobile Data Labs Businesses productivity
12 MSFT Adxstudio Businesses crm
Table 11: Mergers in the core segment, continued targets
Among these twelve acquisitions, there are only two where the target could represent a com-
petitive threat to the buying firm, the Amazon/Souq acquisition and the Facebook/Masquerade
(MSQRD) one.
Souq is an online shopping website active in Arabia and in the Arabic world. There was
however little overlap between the user bases as Amazon was not present in that region. So the
acquisition was a convenient way for Amazon to enter this geographic market and it cannot be
considered as a killer merger. Having said that, it does not mean that there are no competition
concerns.
The Facebook acquisition of masquerade fits perfectly the three criteria. It is a picture
sharing app, similar to SnapChat that offers many filters for selfies. The company experienced
a rapid user growth before the acquisition, with the number of app downloaded growing from
1.92 in January 2016 to 13.2 billion in March 2016 (source: business insider). The product has
been continued after the acquisition. The company was very young (founded in 2015, acquired
in 2016 by Facebook) and attracted a limited funding ($1 million), so it was not yet a sizable
competitor. Still, competition authorities might be in investigating further merger cases like
this one.
16Instagram, WhatsApp and Waze which are referred to as potential examples of killer mergers continue to
operate under their original brand name after having been acquired by Facebook and Google respectively.
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8 Conclusion
When reviewing all acquisition cases of the GAFAM firms in our sample, 2 eye-catching patterns
can be observed. First, most acquisitions are undertaken in core segments or other segments
in which firms have already active beforehand. Second, the majority of acquired products is
discontinued post-acquisition.
This suggest that, first, many acquisitions by these firms are driven by the desire to purchase
valuable R&D inputs like the technology, IP rights and/or people of the target firms. Overall,
more than 60% percent of acquired products are shut after the transaction. This figure suggests
that many mergers qualify as technology acquisitions.
Second, the focus on already known and important segments raises the question whether
these acquisitions are undertaken to increase market power or to realize synergies. The answer
to this question is far from obvious and would need a case by case analysis. However, given
the small size of target products, not just in revenues but also in terms of employees, classical
synergies like economies of scale and scope seem rather implausible. Except beneficial effects
on innovation, the likely motives in these cases are the want to improve market positions and
increase market power by adding new functionalities to their already successful products. The
flip-side of this focus on core segments is that entry seems to be a rare motive to undertake
acquisitions.
Hence, the main motivations in the digital economy for these firms appear to be the acqui-
sition of innovation assets as well as the wish to increase market power. Synergies and market
entry, on the other hand, seem to be play less prominent roles.
The insights taken give a first impression of these firms’ M&A strategies. However, our
classification suffers from limitations that hinder a more precise analysis of these cases.
First of all, the user segments defined in this study to not necessarily represent markets in
an antitrust meaning. In competition law, a market regroups all products competing against
each other. Therefore, it might be possible that products within a same segment in our analysis
are not competing against each other. Vice versa, it is conceivable that products from different
segments could exert competitive pressures on one another. This restricts the implications that
can be taken in terms of competition policy. Classifying products according to user groups is
nevertheless informative and useful. When defining markets, competition authorities rely on
similar elements such as intended use of products and market substitution.
Second, we have no reliable information on the transaction values of these acquisitions. As a
consequence, we treat all cases the same and limit ourselves to counts of mergers. Of course, not
all acquisitions are equally important to the firms. The acquisition of LinkedIn for $26 billion
is likely to have had a bigger impact on Microsoft’s business than the acquisition of a small
start-up. However, since we take into account all acquisition cases for given period, even the
classification of the mere number of acquisitions is revealing and improves our understanding
of firms’ strategies.
Despite the limitations described above, our findings suggest several implications in terms
of competition policy.
The GAFAM firms are widely considered to be economically dominant in their respective
markets. This perception is partly confirmed by competition authorities that opened investiga-
tions against or even fined these firms for violations of antitrust laws. The fact that these firms
are acquiring mostly in their core segments suggests that they are seeking to further strengthen
these market positions.
Except ex-post investigations, the merger control regulation is the ex-ante tool in the an-
titrust arsenal to prevent or limit dominant positions from occurring. Yet, almost all of the
acquisitions by the GAFAM firms fly under the radar of competition law. The low revenues
of many targets prevent these cases from falling under the jurisdiction of antitrust authorities.
Low revenue figures by themselves do not imply, however, that these cases are benign or not
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relevant. Hence, our findings reinforce the already ongoing debate about the appropriateness
of current notification systems based solely on turnover values.
This is especially important in light of the current debate about ”killer” acquisitions. Cases
in which the acquirer purchases a target to stop its innovation process in order to prevent
potential competition from arising. Our findings show that many acquisitions seem to be driven
by innovation considerations. We suppose these are driven by the motive to include R&D assets
in a firm’s own innovation tracks. However, we cannot verify the actual use of these acquisitions.
Whether such ”killer” acquisition behavior occurs the digital economy remains an open question.
Further research is needed to answer this controversy and to be able, if such acquisitions exist,
to identify them as a competition authority.
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Appendix A Acquisition Cases
Nr Acquirer Year Target Segment Brand
1 AMZN 2015 2lemetry Businesses discont.
2 AMZN 2015 Amiato Businesses NA
3 AMZN 2015 Annapurna Labs Businesses NA
4 AMZN 2015 Clusterk Businesses discont.
5 AMZN 2015 Safaba Translation Solutions Businesses discont.
6 AMZN 2015 Shoefitr Merchants discont.
7 AMZN 2015 AppThwack Editors discont.
8 AMZN 2015 Elemental Technologies Editors discont.
9 AMZN 2015 Orbeus NA discont.
10 AMZN 2016 Biba Businesses discont.
11 AMZN 2016 NICE Businesses running
12 AMZN 2016 EMVANTAGE Payments Merchants discont.
13 AMZN 2016 Westland Merchants discont.
14 AMZN 2016 Cloud9 IDE Editors running
15 AMZN 2016 Curse Editors NA
16 AMZN 2016 Angel.ai Consumers discont.
17 AMZN 2016 Partpic Consumers discont.
18 AMZN 2017 Do Businesses discont.
19 AMZN 2017 harvest.ai Businesses discont.
20 AMZN 2017 Dispatch Merchants NA
21 AMZN 2017 Dispatch Merchants NA
22 AMZN 2017 Souq Merchants running
23 AMZN 2017 Whole Foods Market Merchants running
24 AMZN 2017 WING Merchants running
25 AMZN 2017 Body Labs Editors discont.
26 AMZN 2017 GameSparks Editors running
27 AMZN 2017 Thinkbox Software Editors running
28 AMZN 2017 ClipMine Consumers discont.
29 AMZN 2017 Graphiq Consumers discont.
30 AMZN 2017 Blink Platform running
31 APPL 2015 FoundationDB Businesses running
32 APPL 2015 Mapsense Businesses discont.
33 APPL 2015 Camel Audio Editors discont.
34 APPL 2015 faceshift Editors discont.
35 APPL 2015 Semetric Editors discont.
36 APPL 2015 Coherent Navigation Consumers discont.
37 APPL 2015 Perceptio Consumers NA
38 APPL 2015 Dryft Platform NA
39 APPL 2015 Linx Imaging Platform discont.
40 APPL 2015 Metaio Platform discont.
41 APPL 2015 Privaris Platform NA
42 APPL 2015 VocalIQ Platform discont.
43 APPL 2016 LearnSprout Businesses discont.
44 APPL 2016 tuplejump Businesses discont.
45 APPL 2016 Turi Businesses discont.
46 APPL 2016 Flyby Media Consumers discont.
47 APPL 2016 Gliimpse Consumers discont.
48 APPL 2016 indoor.io Consumers discont.
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49 APPL 2016 Emotient Platform discont.
50 APPL 2016 LegbaCore Platform discont.
51 APPL 2017 init.ai Businesses discont.
52 APPL 2017 Lattice Businesses discont.
53 APPL 2017 Workflow Businesses running
54 APPL 2017 Pop Up Archive Editors discont.
55 APPL 2017 Regaind Editors discont.
56 APPL 2017 Shazam Entertainment Editors running
57 APPL 2017 Spektral Editors discont.
58 APPL 2017 Beddit Consumers running
59 APPL 2017 InVisage Technologies Platform discont.
60 APPL 2017 PowerbyProxi Platform discont.
61 APPL 2017 RealFace Platform discont.
62 APPL 2017 SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) Platform discont.
63 APPL 2017 Vrvana Platform discont.
64 FCBK 2015 Teehan+Lax Businesses discont.
65 FCBK 2015 QuickFire Networks Editors discont.
66 FCBK 2015 Tugboat Yards Editors discont.
67 FCBK 2015 Wit.ai Editors running
68 FCBK 2015 TheFind, Inc. Consumers discont.
69 FCBK 2015 Endaga Platform discont.
70 FCBK 2015 Pebbles Interfaces Platform discont.
71 FCBK 2015 Surreal Vision Ltd NA discont.
72 FCBK 2016 CrowdTangle Editors running
73 FCBK 2016 FacioMetrics Editors discont.
74 FCBK 2016 Two Big Ears Ltd Editors NA
75 FCBK 2016 Eyegroove Consumers discont.
76 FCBK 2016 Masquerade Consumers running
77 FCBK 2016 InfiniLED Platform discont.
78 FCBK 2016 Nascent Objects Inc Platform discont.
79 FCBK 2016 The Eye Tribe Platform NA
80 FCBK 2017 Fayteq AG Editors discont.
81 FCBK 2017 Source3 Editors discont.
82 FCBK 2017 Ozlo Consumers discont.
83 FCBK 2017 tbh Consumers NA
84 GOOG 2015 Bebop Businesses discont.
85 GOOG 2015 Granata Decision Systems Businesses NA
86 GOOG 2015 Timeful Businesses discont.
87 GOOG 2015 Softcard Merchants discont.
88 GOOG 2015 Toro Advertisers discont.
89 GOOG 2015 Apportable Editors discont.
90 GOOG 2015 Divshot Editors discont.
91 GOOG 2015 Launchpad Toys Editors discont.
92 GOOG 2015 Oyster Editors discont.
93 GOOG 2015 Pixate Editors running
94 GOOG 2015 Pulse.io Editors discont.
95 GOOG 2015 Thrive Audio Editors discont.
96 GOOG 2015 Digisfera Consumers discont.
97 GOOG 2015 Fly Labs Consumers discont.
98 GOOG 2015 Jibe Mobile Consumers NA
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99 GOOG 2015 Odysee Consumers discont.
100 GOOG 2015 Agawi Inc NA discont.
101 GOOG 2015 Skillman & Hackett NA running
102 GOOG 2016 Dialogflow Businesses running
103 GOOG 2016 Hark Businesses NA
104 GOOG 2016 Orbitera, Inc. Businesses running
105 GOOG 2016 Pie Businesses discont.
106 GOOG 2016 Qwiklabs Businesses running
107 GOOG 2016 Subarctic Limited Businesses NA
108 GOOG 2016 Synergyse Businesses discont.
109 GOOG 2016 Anvato Editors running
110 GOOG 2016 Apigee Editors running
111 GOOG 2016 Bandpage Editors discont.
112 GOOG 2016 FameBit Editors running
113 GOOG 2016 LaunchKit Editors discont.
114 GOOG 2016 Moodstocks Editors discont.
115 GOOG 2016 Kifi Consumers discont.
116 GOOG 2016 LeapDroid Consumers discont.
117 GOOG 2016 Undecidable Labs Consumers NA
118 GOOG 2016 Urban Engines Consumers discont.
119 GOOG 2016 Cronologics Corporation Platform discont.
120 GOOG 2016 Eyefluence Platform discont.
121 GOOG 2016 Webpass Platform running
122 GOOG 2017 AppBridge Businesses running
123 GOOG 2017 Bitium Businesses running
124 GOOG 2017 Kaggle Businesses running
125 GOOG 2017 Limes Audio Businesses discont.
126 GOOG 2017 60dB Editors discont.
127 GOOG 2017 Crashlytics Editors running
128 GOOG 2017 Fastlane Editors running
129 GOOG 2017 Owlchemy Labs Editors running
130 GOOG 2017 AIMatter Consumers running
131 GOOG 2017 Relay Media Consumers running
132 GOOG 2017 Senosis Health Consumers NA
133 GOOG 2017 HTC - Pixel Phone Division Platform discont.
134 GOOG 2017 Redux ST Platform NA
135 GOOG 2017 Halli Labs NA discont.
136 MSFT 2015 6Wunderkinder / Wunderlist Businesses running
137 MSFT 2015 Adallom Businesses discont.
138 MSFT 2015 Adxstudio Businesses running
139 MSFT 2015 BlueStripe Businesses discont.
140 MSFT 2015 Datazen Software Businesses NA
141 MSFT 2015 FantasySalesTeam Businesses discont.
142 MSFT 2015 FieldOne Systems Businesses discont.
143 MSFT 2015 LiveLoop Businesses discont.
144 MSFT 2015 Metanautix Businesses discont.
145 MSFT 2015 Mobile Data Labs Businesses running
146 MSFT 2015 Revolution Analytics Businesses NA
147 MSFT 2015 Secure Islands Technologies Businesses discont.
148 MSFT 2015 Sunrise Businesses running
32
Nr Acquirer Year Target Segment Brand
149 MSFT 2015 Talko Businesses discont.
150 MSFT 2015 VoloMetrix Businesses discont.
151 MSFT 2015 Havok Editors running
152 MSFT 2015 Double Labs Platform NA
153 MSFT 2015 N-Trig Platform discont.
154 MSFT 2016 Event Zero Businesses running
155 MSFT 2016 Genee Businesses discont.
156 MSFT 2016 LinkedIn Businesses running
157 MSFT 2016 PointDrive Businesses discont.
158 MSFT 2016 Solair Businesses discont.
159 MSFT 2016 Groove (dba Zikera) Editors running
160 MSFT 2016 MinecraftEdu Editors running
161 MSFT 2016 Mixer Editors running
162 MSFT 2016 Wand Labs Editors discont.
163 MSFT 2016 Xamarin Editors NA
164 MSFT 2016 SwiftKey Platform running
165 MSFT 2017 Cloudyn Businesses discont.
166 MSFT 2017 Cycle Computing Businesses running
167 MSFT 2017 Deis.com Businesses discont.
168 MSFT 2017 Heighten Businesses discont.
169 MSFT 2017 Hexadite Businesses discont.
170 MSFT 2017 Intentional Software Businesses discont.
171 MSFT 2017 Donya Labs Editors running
172 MSFT 2017 Open Build Service Editors running
173 MSFT 2017 AltspaceVR Consumers running
174 MSFT 2017 Swing Technologies Consumers discont.
175 MSFT 2017 Maluuba NA NA
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Appendix B Additional statistics
Table 13: Summary statistics Age, funding rounds and funding
(a) Age of Targets
Acquirer Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. NAs
all 0 3.00 4.00 5.97 7.00 54 1
AMZN 1 3.00 4.00 8.00 7.75 54 0
APPL 1 3.00 4.00 6.52 10.00 26 0
FCBK 1 2.00 3.00 4.05 5.00 13 0
GOOG 0 3.00 3.00 4.42 5.00 20 0
MSFT 2 3.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 18 1
(b) Number of Funding Rounds
Acquirer Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. NAs
All 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.55 3.00 14.00 52
AMZN 1.00 1.75 2.00 2.62 3.00 7.00 6
APPL 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.87 2.00 14.00 10
FCBK 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.80 2.50 4.00 5
GOOG 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.27 3.00 10.00 19
MSFT 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.96 4.00 9.00 12
(c) Total Amount of Funding (in thousands $ )
Acquirer Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. NAs
All 15.00 2,000.00 5,160.77 21,016.00 15,561.25 460,000.00 71
AMZN 50.00 1,880.00 4,296.50 33,713.37 13,778.75 460,000.00 10
APPL 350.00 1,695.70 4,700.00 20,911.21 21,781.80 143,500.00 15
FCBK 1000.00 3,215.00 3,775.00 7,714.15 11,830.39 26,000.00 10
GOOG 15.00 1,500.00 4,639.98 13,426.02 11,200.00 197,679.00 23
MSFT 520.00 3,450.00 10,500.00 24,759.21 21,045.61 154,800.00 13
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